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 Tribal-State Affairs: American States as
 'Disclaiming' Sovereigns
 David E. Wilkins
 University of Arizona
 The history of tribal-state political relations has been contentious from the beginning of the republic.
 As a result of these tensions, the relationship of tribal nations and thefederal government was federalized
 when the U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1788. Thus, a number of states, especially in the West, were
 required in their organic acts and constitutions to forever disclaim jurisdiction over Indian property and
 persons. This article analyzes these disclaimer clauses, explains thefactors that have enabled the states to
 assume some jurisdictional presence in Indian Country, examines the key issues in which disclaimers
 continue to carry significant weight, and argues that the federal government should reclaim its role as
 the lone constitutional authority to deal with indigenous nations.
 In Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council (1959)1, a federal
 district court stated that "Indian tribes are not states. They have a status higher
 than that of states." Notwithstanding this statement, states have often acted as
 if they were the political superiors of tribal nations. Such assertions of state
 jurisdiction in Indian Country,2 absent tribal and federal consent, are prob-
 lematic, however, because they violate the doctrine of inherent tribal sover-
 eignty,s run afoul of the treaty relationship between federally recognized tribes
 and the federal government, damage the federally recognized trust doctrine,4
 AUTHOR'S NOTE: I wish to thank reviewers for their careful reading of earlier versions of this essay.
 Special thanks to Tsianina Lomawaima, David Gibbs, and Franke Wilmer for their critical comments and
 suggestions.
 '272 F. 2d 131 (1959).
 2Broadly, it is country within which Indian laws and customs and federal laws relating to Indians are
 generally applicable. It is also defined as all the land under the supervision and protection of the United
 States government that has been set aside primarily for the use of Indians. This includes all Indian
 reservations and any other area under federal jurisdiction and designated for Indian use (Title 18, U.S.
 Code, Section 1151).
 3Tribes, as preexisting polities, exercise a number of political and legal powers that only sovereigns
 may wield, such as the power to adopt a form of government; to define the conditions of tribal citizen-
 ship/membership; to regulate the domestic relations of the tribe's citizens/members; to prescribe rules
 of inheritance with respect to all personal property; to levy dues, fees, or taxes on tribal citizens and non-
 Indian residents; and to administer justice. For details, see the Solicitor's Opinion, "Powers of Indian
 Tribes," Opinions of the Solicitor, 25 October 1934, 55 I.D. 14, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
 the Interior, 1974), pp. 445-477.
 4The "trust doctrine" or "trust responsibility," as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Seminole v.
 United States, holds that there is a "distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its
 dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited peoples. In carrying out its treaty obligations
 with the Indian tribes, the Government is something more than a mere contracting party. Under a hu-
 mane and self-imposed policy which has found expression in many acts of the Congress, and numerous
 decisions of this Court, it has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. Its
 conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who represent it in dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged by the
 most exactingfiduciary standards, 316 U.S. 286, 296-297 (1942).
 ? Publius: The Journal of Federalism 28:4 (Fall 1998)
 55
This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Tue, 03 Dec 2019 19:48:37 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 56 Publius/Fall 1998
 and breach the doctrine of federal supremacy in the field of Indian affairs
 outlined expressly in the commerce clause and implicitly in the treaty clause
 of the U.S. Constitution. Those two clauses, the U.S. Supreme Court has
 held, provide Congress with "all that is required" for complete control over
 Indian affairs.5
 Furthermore, and most important for our purposes, state efforts to move
 into the internal political and economic affairs of tribal nations within their
 borders appears to violate the Indian disclaimer clauses that 11 Western
 states (Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3) were required by the federal govern-
 ment to include in their territorial acts, enabling acts, and constitutions.
 These 11 states are home to more than 80 percent of the United States
 indigenous population and nearly all of the country's 278 Indian reserva-
 tions. Those clauses, dating from Wisconsin's territorial disclaimer of 1836,
 to Alaska's constitutional disclaimer of 1959, expressly declare that these
 territories-later states-are precluded from extending their authority in-
 side Indian Country. There is some important variation in language in these
 measures (Tables 1-3). Generally, however, each contains language designed
 to assure both tribes and the federal government that the territory/state
 will never, without federal consent and/or a treaty modification, interfere
 with the internal affairs of tribal nations.
 For example, Arizona's disclaimer clause is found in Article 20: Ordinance,
 4th and 5th sections, of the state's constitution, which became effective on
 12 February 1912 when it was admitted to the Union. It reads:
 The people inhabiting this State do agree and declare that they
 forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated and
 ungranted public lands lying within the boundaries thereof and
 to all lands lying within said boundaries owned or held by any
 Indian or Indian tribes, the right or title to which shall have
 been acquired through or from the United States or any prior
 sovereignty, and that, until the tide of such Indian or Indian
 tribes shall have been extinguished, the same shall be, and re-
 main, subject to the disposition and under the absolute jurisdic-
 tion and control of the Congress of the United States...and no
 taxes shall be imposed by this State on any lands or other prop-
 erty within an Indian Reservation owned or held by any Indian.6
 The federal government, in requiring certain states to include these clauses,
 assumed the double duty of "preserving to the Indians the quiet possession of
 the reservation as their future home and protecting their persons and property
 therein, and this duty and obligation still exists, never having been released by
 the actions of the Indians or by treaty or agreement with them."7
 5See, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832).
 6Constitutions of the United States: National and State: Alaska (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications,
 1993), p. 75.
 7United States v. Ewing, 47 Fed. 809, 813 (1891), emphasis added.
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 In a few instances, the federal government has acted to delegate its
 constitutional authority over Indian affairs to states, though there is a ques-
 tion as to whether the United States government may legitimately make
 such a delegation without attaching to such delegation the existing treaty
 and trust protections guaranteed to tribes by the United States in the Con-
 stitution, treaties, statutes, executive orders, and court decisions.s
 As President Bill Clinton noted in an executive order issued on 18 May
 1998, "the United States has a unique legal relationship with Indian tribal
 governments...in treaties our Nation has guaranteed the right of Indian
 tribes to self-government."9 Thus, if the states are indeed constitution-
 ally intertwined with the national government, then an argument can
 be made that the treaty and trust commitments of the United States to
 tribes should not be terminated unilaterally absent a mutually agreed
 upon treaty modification with the tribes' informed consent. As the Su-
 preme Court held in The Kansas Indians, Indian treaty rights may not be
 adversely affected except "by purchase or by a new arrangement [treaty]
 with the United States."'o
 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DISCLAIMERS
 Federalism in the United States has had a fluid history, and tribal political
 fortunes have sometimes hinged on how the balancing contest has worked
 out between states and the federal government. From the Articles of
 Confederation through the American Revolution, to the current Indian
 gaming controversies," the colonies, territories, and later states have
 frequently vied with the federal government for jurisdictional control of
 Indian people, lands, and resources.
 Tribal nations are frustrated by the repeated federal and state assertions
 of political dominance over their peoples and resources, but insist on main-
 taining the nation-to-nation political relationship established by treaties and
 sustained by the trust doctrine with the federal government. The federal
 government maintains that it is the superior sovereign vis-a-vis the tribes
 and also the states with respect to the tribes. It also has acted to acknowledge
 the sovereignty of the tribes (through treaties and the trust relationship)
 *The U.S. Supreme Court, Parker v. Richard, 250 U.S. 235 (1919), held as much when it determined
 that state courts act practically as a federal agency when the Congress delegates authority for them to act
 regarding Indian oil and gas royalties. "That the agency which is to approve or not is a state court is not
 material. It is the agency selected by the Congress and the authority confided to it is to be exercised in
 giving effect to the will of the Congress in respect of a matter within its control. Thus in a practical sense
 the court in exercising that authority acts as a federal agency... Plainly, the restrictions have the same
 force and operate in the same way as if Congress had selected another agency, exclusively federal, such as
 the Superintendent of the Five Civilized Tribes" (p. 239).
 9Office of the President, Executive Order 13084, "Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal
 Governments," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 18 May 1998, vol. 34, no. 20, p. 869.
 105 Wall. 787 (1867).
 "See, for example, Heidi L. McNeil, "Indian Gaming: Prosperity and Controversy," American Indian
 Relationships in a Modern Arizona Economy, ed. Malcolm Merrill (Phoenix, AZ: Arizona Town Hall, 1994),
 pp. 105-121.
This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Tue, 03 Dec 2019 19:48:37 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 58 Publius/Fall 1998
 and is constitutionally bound to acknowledge state sovereignty, but historically
 has vacillated in supporting the tribes or the states in tribal-state conflicts.
 The states have been frustrated by the persistence of tribal nations as
 separate geographical, political, and racial enclaves within their borders,
 despite the federal government's intensive assimilation campaign from the
 early 1800s to the late 1950s aimed at forcing indigenous nations tojettison
 their cultural identities and part with their communal lands.'" States have
 felt hampered by the federal government's vacillating policies for tribes:
 Are tribes to be legally terminated and their members assimilated, or are
 they to be respected as extraconstitutional sovereigns generally free of state
 jurisdiction? Finally, how are the states to cope with the reality that Indians
 have citizenship rights in all three polities?
 When the U.S. Constitution was drafted, the framers made a clear
 declaration of federal supremacy over all matters relating to commerce
 with Indian nations (i.e., the commerce clause). Some of the 13 original
 states, however, especially Georgia and NewYork, continued to act as if they
 had retained sovereignty over Indian affairs, and they continued to con-
 duct relations with tribes as if the commerce clause were not present.'3
 Nevertheless, when the Congress of the Confederation enacted the
 Northwest Ordinance of 1787,14 it provided for three stages of government
 for the territories and states into which the region was to be divided. First,
 authority was to be exercised by federal appointees. In the second stage,
 authority was to be shared by these appointees and a representative assem-
 bly, with the governor still appointed by the president. Finally, the state was to
 be admitted to the Union on an equal footing with the old states.15 This third
 stage was fulfilled only after the territory had attained a population of 60,000
 free inhabitants and adopted a constitution, created a republican form of gov-
 ernment, and determined the qualifications for voting and holding office.
 Article Three of the ordinance stated that the federal government would
 always observe the "utmost good faith" toward Indians and that their lands
 and property would never be taken without tribal consent. Thus, while a
 few of the 13 original states would continue to contest federal supremacy in
 the nation's commercial and political affairs with tribes, the Northwest
 Ordinance, alongside the commerce clause and treaty relationship, un-
 equivocally acknowledged that the federal government was in charge of
 the nation's Indian policy in the territories.
 '2See, for example, Francis Paul Prucha, ed., Americanizing the American Indians: Writings by the 'Friends
 of the Indian:' 1880-1900 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973); Frederick E. Hoxie, A Final
 Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
 "3See Jill Norgren, The Cherokee Cases: The Confrontation of Law and Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill,
 1996).
 '4See Peter S. Onuf, Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance (Bloomington: Indiana
 University Press, 1987); Daniel J. Elazar, ed., "Land and Liberty in American Society: The Land Ordi-
 nance of 1785 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 18 (Fall 1988):
 entire issue.
 "SPaul W. Gates, History of Public Land Law Development (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
 Office, 1968), p. 72.
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 All new states were admitted "on an equal footing" with the original states,
 being guaranteed a republican form of government, adequate lands for
 schools, a percentage of the net proceeds from the sale of public lands for
 constructing roads, and so on. However, a precondition of territoriality
 and then statehood was the federal government's reservation of power and
 authority over Indian affairs. The equal footing doctrine, in other words,
 does not interfere with the federal government's authority under the
 commerce clause, the property clause, the supremacy clause, or the treaty-
 making authority.
 Although the states have been constrained by the Constitution's delegation
 of Indian policy to Congress, there are few instances where a state has actually
 expunged or modified its disclaimer clause. Congress, on a few occasions,
 has delegated a measure of its constitutional authority over Indian affairs
 to states, but aside from these few explicit exceptions, states have no consti-
 tutional authority inside Indian Country absent congressional invitation,
 an amendment of the state's statutes or constitution, and, arguably, absent
 a modification of existing Indian treaties.
 WHY THE NEED FOR DISCLAIMERS?
 Commentators who have researched disclaimers have provided several
 explanations for why the federal government crafted territorial and state
 disclaimers. We can group the explanations into three interrelated catego-
 ries: expediency, treaties/trust, and exclusive/supremacy.
 Expediency
 This argument holds that the Indians were to be protected in their lands
 only until such time as they were ready to be removed or assimilated. How-
 ever:
 As the removal policy was winding down, the pace at which states
 were being settled, formed, and admitted to the union began to
 outstrip the speed with which the federal government could re-
 move tribes from the states prior to statehood. Thus, beginning
 with the admission of Wisconsin and Kansas, Congress began to
 insist that some states disclaim authority andjurisdiction over lin-
 gering vestiges of Indian country by including such disclaimers
 in the enabling or statehood legislation in their state constitutions.'"
 This explanation does not tell us, however, why the Congress insisted
 that only some states agree to such a disclaimer. Presumably, as Justice
 WilliamJ. Brennan put it, it had "more to do with historical timing than with
 '6Robert N. Clinton, Nell Jessup Newton, and Monroe E. Price, American Indian Law: Cases and
 Materials, 3rd ed. (Charlottesville, VA: Michie, 1991), pp. 500-501.
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 deliberate congressional selection."" Brennan here is referring to the
 McBratney'8 decision of 1881, which appears to have played a pivotal role in
 determining which states were required to have disclaimers. This case will
 be discussed later.
 Treaties/Trust
 According to Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, "at the time Congress required
 the disclaimers, they were necessary to protect Indian populations from
 homesteaders and settlers. By demanding the disclaimers, the federal gov-
 ernment acknowledged its obligation to stand between these two hostile
 groups and prevent continuing exploitation of the Indians."'9 Congress,
 says Goldberg-Abrose:
 Began insisting on disclaimers of state jurisdiction over Indian
 reservations immediately after United States Supreme Court
 decisions first indicated the possibility that suchjurisdiction could
 be exercised. Viewed in this light, the disclaimers are more than
 protection against Indian loss of real property interests; they are
 congressional insulation against state jurisdiction over reserva-
 tion Indians.20
 For example, in United States v. Stahl,21 a United States circuit court held
 that when Kansas was admitted to the Union, it came in on an equal foot-
 ing with the original states and although the federal government retained
 title to the land it owned within the state, it relinquishedjurisdiction over it
 insofar as the general purposes of government were concerned with cer-
 tain exceptions. "The first exception reserved the lands of Indian tribes
 which had treaties exempting them from state jurisdiction; the second, the
 power to tax the lands of the United States and of the Indians."22
 It is the treaty dimension that receives the slightest amount of treatment
 in contemporary judicial, state, or congressional discussions about tribal-
 state relations; yet, it is a most important dimension. The Cherokee Treaty of
 182823 contained explicit language in this regard. The Cherokee were guaran-
 teed a "permanent" home in their newly acquired western lands, and they
 were assured by the federal negotiators that "under the most solemn guaran-
 tee of the United States," it would remain theirs forever. It would be a home
 "that shall never, in all future time, be embarrassed by having extended around
 it the lines, or placed over it the jurisdiction of a Territory or State."24
 "'Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545, 562 (1983).
 l8104 U.S. 621 (1881).
 '9Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, "Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation
 Indians," UCLA Law Review 22 (October 1974): 570.
 20Ibid.
 2127 Fed. Cas. No. 16, 373 (1868).
 nIbid., 1289.
 237 Stat. 311-15.
 24Ibid., 311.
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 Three years later, the Shawnee Nation negotiated a treaty with the United
 States in which the Shawnee were guaranteed under Article 10 that their
 lands "shall never be within the bounds of any State or territory, nor subject
 to the laws thereof."25 Many other treaties contained provisions in which
 the tribes were assured that their relationship was solely with the federal
 government. For example, a treaty with the Apache in 1852 acknowledged
 this nation-to-nation status. Article One states: "Said nation or tribe of In-
 dians through their authorized Chiefs aforesaid do hereby acknowledge
 and declare that they are lawfully and exclusively under the laws, jurisdic-
 tion, and government of the United States of America."26
 This argument is also supported by the language found in congressional
 reports like those accompanying debates on statehood. An adverse report
 attached to a House report2" on the "Admission of Dakota, Montana, Wash-
 ington, and New Mexico," written by Representative William Springer of
 the Committee on the Territories, recognized the extraterritorial and non-
 taxable nature of Indian Country, which had been confirmed in Dakota's
 territorial disclaimer clause of 1861. That measure provided that:
 Nothing in this act contained shall be construed to impair the
 rights or person or property now pertaining to the Indians in
 said Territory, so long as such rights shall remain unextinguished
 by treaty between the United States and such Indians, or to in-
 clude any territory which, by treaty with any Indian tribe, is not,
 without the consent of said tribe, to be included within the terri-
 torial limits orjurisdiction of any State or Territory; but all such
 territory shall be excepted out of the boundaries and constitute
 no part of the Territory of Dakota, until said tribe shall signify
 their assent to the President of the United States to be included
 within the said Territory or to affect the authority of the govern-
 ment of the United States to make any regulations respecting
 such Indians, their lands, property, or other rights by treaty law,
 or otherwise, which it would have been competent for the gov-
 ernment to make if this act had never been passed.28
 Thus, Springer, in authoring his negative report, was reminding his fellow
 committee members of both the sovereign and the separate proprietary
 interests of the Indians who had not consented to any alteration of their
 land base. He further noted that a major reason against statehood was the
 fact that there were nine Indian reservations in the territory, the jurisdic-
 tion over which was reserved exclusively in the federal government so long
 25Ibid., 355.
 2610 Stat. 979.
 27U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Territories, Admission ofDakota, Montana, Washington, and New
 Mexico into the Union, 50th Cong., 1st sess., 1888.
 28U.S. Government Printing Office, "Temporary Government for the Territory of Dakota," The Federal
 and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies, ed.
 Francis N. Thorpe, vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909), pp. 28-46.
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 as Indian title exists. Springer said, "the State can not tax the lands in these
 reservations, or derive any advantages from them. These reservations com-
 prise over 26,847,105 acres, or 41,984 square miles.....White population is
 prohibited upon all these Indian reservations, and so far as the govern-
 ment and the State of South Dakota is concerned, the Indian reservations
 might be excluded entirely."'
 Exclusion/Supremacy
 Maxwell Carr-Howard states that Congress' protection of its absolute
 control over the nation's relations with tribes was evidenced in the fact that
 "many western states were given a clear message to avoid any involvement
 in tribal lands and governments when Congress required, as a condition of
 their admittance into the Union, that each state 'forever disclaim all right
 and title to Indian lands within their borders.'"'3 Michael Lieder corrobo-
 rates this view by maintaining that the "scanty evidence available indicates
 that Congress [in making disclaimers] intended only to ensure that the
 United States retained jurisdiction over Indians and Indian affairs that it
 already enjoyed in other states."3'
 Finally, Glen Davies has argued that Congress, as a result of the McBratney
 decision of 1881, required each state admitted to the Union between 1881
 and 1912 to guarantee in its constitution that absolute jurisdiction over
 Indian lands would remain lodged in the federal government until such
 time as the Indians gained a measure of proprietary independence from
 federal trust restrictions on their lands.32
 There is more evidence supporting this third rationale than for the first
 two. For example, in The Kansas Indians,33 which combines elements of
 exclusive/supremacy and treaties/trust, the Supreme Court held that the
 various treaties made between the Shawnee and other tribes and the United
 States required that the federal government protect the persons and property
 of the Indians upon their reservations and that this duty was not termi-
 nated by the admission of Kansas into statehood. In the Court's words:
 There can be no question of State sovereignty in the case, as
 Kansas accepted her admission into the family of States on con-
 dition that the Indian rights should remain unimpaired and the
 general government at liberty to make any regulation respect-
 ing them, their lands, property, or other rights....While the gen-
 eral government has a superintending care over their interests,
 -U.S. House, Admission of Dakota, p. 24.
 S3Maxwell Carr-Howard, "Tribal-State Relations: Time for Constitutional Stature?" New Mexico Law
 Review 26 (Spring 1996): 294-295.
 "3Michael Lieder, "Adjudication of Indian Water Rights Under the McCarran Amendment: Two Courts
 are Better Than One," Georgetown LawJournal 71 (February 1983): 1031.
 S2Glen E. Davies, "State Taxation on Indian Reservations," Utah Law Review (July 1966): 137.
 "572 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866).
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 and continues to treat with them as a nation, the State of Kansas
 is estopped from denying their title to it. She accepted this sta-
 tus when she accepted the act admitting her into the Union.
 Conferring rights and privileges on these Indians cannot affect
 their situation, which can only be changed by treaty stipulation,
 or a voluntary abandonment of their tribal organization. As long
 as the United States recognizes their national character they are
 under the protection of treaties and the laws of Congress, and
 their property is withdrawn from the operation of state laws.34
 In United States v. Ewing, a case involving larceny on the Yankton Sioux
 Reservation, the federal district court ruled in favor of federal jurisdiction
 over such matters. In discussing the impact of the disclaimer clause found
 in South Dakota's territorial and state organic acts, the court ruled that the
 disclaimers were "unquestionably included therein for the purpose of pre-
 venting any question arising as to the construed power and control of the
 United States over the Indian Country."35 Such absolute power was necessary,
 said the court, in order for the United States to fulfill its treaty obligations
 and other duties to the Indians.
 The U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v. Sandoval,36 affirmed that the
 United States had a trust obligation to protect the lands of the Pueblo na-
 tions from non-Indian intruders. The court also held that the disclaimer
 clause in New Mexico's enabling act unquestionably confirmed that the
 state assented to the federal government's exercise of exclusive authority to
 regulate commerce with the Indians.
 Finally, in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,37 the U.S. Supreme
 Court again confirmed the exclusive nature of the tribal-federal relation-
 ship by holding that "since the signing of the Navajo treaty, the Congress
 has consistently acted upon the assumption that the States lacked jurisdic-
 tion over Navajos living on the reservation.""8 This was most clearly evi-
 denced in Arizona's disclaimer clause in which the state's entry to the Union
 was expressly conditioned on the promise that the state would "forever dis-
 claim all right and title to...all lands lying within said boundaries owned or
 held by any Indian or Indian tribes.""39
 Whichever reason or combination of reasons is accepted, the common
 denominator among all is that Congress intended to retain its exclusive
 relationship with tribal nations based on treaties, trust, and preemption,
 and that states were completely removed from this dyadic affair. However,
 because of federalism's fluidity--sometimes supporting a strong national
 34Ibid., 755-757.
 S5United States v. Ewing, 47 Fed. 809, 813 (1891).
 36231 U.S. 28 (1913).
 37411 U.S. 164 (1973).
 38Ibid., 175.
 "3Ibid.
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 government, sometimes stressing states' rights-along with demographic
 changes (non-Indians moving into Indian Country), the independence
 of federal courts, and state agitation for greaterjurisdiction over Indian
 lands and their inhabitants, there have been congressional and judicial
 moments when some states have been granted a measure ofjurisdiction
 inside Indian Country, despite extant disclaimers and treaty rights, and
 absent express tribal consent.
 In the ensuing sections, we closely examine the disclaimer clauses
 themselves, beginning with those found in the territorial acts, then in
 the admission acts, and finally in the state constitutions.
 TERRITORIAL DISCLAIMERS
 Territorial governance was carried out by a few federal officials who resided
 in each of the territories-a governor, a secretary, and three or more justices,
 each appointed by the president. Surveyors, revenue collectors, attorneys,
 and other officials came from Washington and provided services in terri-
 tories.40 The territorial governors were assigned a multitude of duties.
 For instance, the governor of the Oregon Territory, which was estab-
 lished in 1848, was commander-in-chief of the militia, served as the
 superintendent of Indian affairs, could grant pardons for offenses against
 the territory's laws, and was chief executive officer.41 The most distinc-
 tive feature of the territorial system was its transitional and progressive
 character, looking toward statehood. Under the U.S. Constitution, Con-
 gress retained supreme power over the territories, which makes the in-
 sertion of disclaimer clauses in the territorial acts all the more interesting
 given that Congress and the president already had exclusive authority
 under the U.S. Constitution.
 Twelve territorial acts (Table 1) contained express Indian disclaimer
 clauses. The act establishing the territorial government of Wisconsin, for
 example, had two references to Indians. Section 4 contained a clause simi-
 lar to that found in the U.S. Constitution in two places in which Indians are
 excluded from official population enumeration for determining congres-
 sional representation.42
 The enumeration clause of the Wisconsin statute, which is also found
 in the other territorial acts, stated that "an apportionment shall be
 made...among the several counties for the election of the council
 and representatives, giving to each section of the Territory repre-
 sentation in the ration of its population, Indians excepted, as nearly
 as may be."43
 4oEarl S. Pomeroy, The Territories and the United States: 1861-1890 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsyl-
 vania Press, 1947).
 4'Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions, p. 2986.
 42Article 1, sec. 2, clause 3; Fourteenth Amendment, sec. 2.
 435 Stat. 10.
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 Table 1
 Territories with Indian Disclaimer Clauses
 Territory Date Key language
 Wisconsin 1836 Indian rights not to be impaired until extinguished by treaty.
 Iowa 1838 Same as above.
 Oregon 1848 Same as above.
 Washington 1853 Federal government retains power to make Indian policy by
 treaty or law.
 Kansas 1854 Indian rights not to be impaired until extinguished by treaty:
 Indian lands not to be included in territory without tribal consent.
 Nebraska 1854 Same as above.
 Colorado 1861 Same as above.
 North Dakota 1861 Indian rights not to be impaired.
 Idaho 1863 Same as above.
 Montana 1864 Indian rights not to be impaired until extinguished by treaty:
 Indian lands not to be included in territory without tribal consent.
 Wyoming 1868 Indian rights not to be impaired.
 Oklahoma 1890 Indian rights not to be impaired until extinguished by treaty.
 The disclaimer clause is found in Section 1 which, among other things,
 demarcated the territorial boundaries of Wisconsin:
 Nothing in this act contained shall be construed to impair the
 rights of person or property now appertaining to any Indians
 within the said Territory so long as such rights shall remain un-
 extinguished by treaty between the United States and such Indi-
 ans, or to impair the obligations of any treaty now existing
 between the United States and such Indians, or to impair or
 anywise to affect the authority of the Government of the United
 States to make any regulations respecting such Indians, their
 lands, property, or other rights, by treaty, or law, or otherwise,
 which it would have been competent to the Government to make
 if this act had never been passed."
 Federal lawmakers were warning the territorial residents and their leaders
 not to interfere with the treaty relationship between the tribes and the fed-
 eral government, which outlined the duties and responsibilities of both
 parties. The United States' exclusive and constitutionally grounded au-
 thority to enact regulations dealing with tribes and their property or
 rights, whether derived from treaties or laws, was not to be intruded
 upon either.
 44Ibid., 11.
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 Iowa's territorial disclaimer of 1838 was identical to Wisconsin's.45
 Oregon's, enacted in 1848,46 was substantially similar, though it did not
 repeat the section found in Wisconsin's and Iowa's, which stated: "or to
 impair the obligations of any treaty now existing between the United States
 and such Indians." Washington's territorial act contained an even more
 abbreviated disclaimer and excluded the section on impairing the rights of
 Indians, absent a treaty change.47
 The 1854 territorial act for Kansas and Nebraska,48 however, returned to
 the lengthy recognition of Indian treaty rights and the securing of Indian
 consent that had been deleted from Washington's act. It emphasized the
 extraterritorial nature of Indian Country until and unless the tribes re-
 quested otherwise. The relevant phrases were that nothing would impair
 Indian rights "so long as such rights shall remain unextinguished by treaty
 between the United States and such Indians, or to include any territory
 which, by treaty with any Indian tribe, is not, without the consent of said
 tribe, to be included within the territorial limits orjurisdiction of any State
 or Territory; but all such territory shall be excepted out of the
 boundaries...until said tribe shall signify their assent to the President of
 the United States."''49
 The acts for Colorado (1861), Dakota and Idaho (1863), and Montana
 (1864) read virtually identical to the one for Kansas and Nebraska.
 Wyoming's 1868 act returned to the brevity of Washington's measure. The
 act said simply "that nothing in this act shall be construed to impair the
 rights of person or property now pertaining to the Indians in said Territory,
 so long as such rights shall remain unextinguished by treaty between the
 United States and such Indians."50
 Interestingly, territories such as New Mexico (1850), Arizona (1863),
 Michigan (1805), Alaska (1854), and Minnesota (1844), which were the
 aboriginal home of many indigenous groups, contained no express disclaim-
 ers. The only references to Indians in those territorial acts were contained
 in the enumeration section (Indians cannot be counted for purposes of
 determining the number of representatives) and a statement declaring that
 the governor of the territory was also the superintendent of Indian affairs.
 A major exception to what hasjust been discussed is the unique development of
 the Indian Territory (later Oklahoma). While this area has been admirably
 treated by a number of scholars,5' suffice it to say that a majority of the
 Indian nations now inhabiting Oklahoma either migrated there or were
 45Thorpe, The Federal and State Constitutions, vol. 2, 1112.
 469 Stat. 323.
 47Thorpe, The Federal and State Constitutions, vol. 7, 3963.
 4810 Stat. 277.
 49Ibid., 277-278.
 5"Thorpe, The Federal and State Constitutions, vol. 7, 4106.
 51See, for example, Grant Foreman, The Five Civilized Tribes (Norman, OK University of Oklahoma
 Press, 1934); Angie Debo, And Still the Waters Run: The Betrayal of the Five Civilized Tribes (Princeton, NJ:
 Princeton University Press, 1940).
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 forcibly relocated there during the Indian Removal period of the 1830s-1860s.
 In 1834, the Congress passed an act for the government of the Indian Coun-
 try, which recognized that the land belonged solely to the Indians, and it
 established regulations for trade and intercourse with the tribes.52
 Years later, in 1890, as white settlement had increased substantially in
 Indian Territory, and despite treaty assurances, whites desired to establish
 their own governing mechanisms. By the act of 2 May 1890, a sizable portion
 of the Indian Territory was transformed into the new Territory of Okla-
 homa. This territorial act contained an express disclaimer, intended to
 assure tribes in the area that their remaining lands, resources, and rights
 would be respected. It read like many of the others described above, al-
 though coming in the wake of the direct treaty violations, the failure of the
 federal government to protect Indian lands and its establishment of a for-
 eign territorial government out of tribal lands, the words had a hollow ring.
 The clause reads as follows:
 That nothing in this act shall be construed to impair any right
 now pertaining to any Indians or Indian tribe in said Territory
 under the laws, agreements, and treaties of the United States, or
 to impair the rights of person or property pertaining to said In-
 dians, or to affect the authority of the Government of the United
 States to make any regulation or to make any law respecting said
 Indians, their lands, property, or other rights which it would have
 been competent to make or enact if this act had not been
 passed.53
 ENABLING ACT DISCLAIMERS
 These organic laws strike at the heart of the tension between tribes and
 states as well as the doctrine of federalism. Enabling acts outline the steps
 a territory's citizenry must take to become a state. Thus, the inclusion of
 disclaimer clauses in these core political documents was an explicit recog-
 nition of the supremacy of the federal government over Indian affairs. Al-
 though states chafed at this reservation, claiming that it was an infringement
 on their rights, as a federal court noted in United States v. Board of Commis-
 sioners of Osage County,54 "there cannot be an invasion of State rights be-
 cause a condition of statehood was the reserving by the Federal Government
 of power and authority over Indians, their lands and property."55
 The Congress passed the first enabling act on 30 April 1802. This act autho-
 rized the inhabitants of the eastern district of the Northwest Territories to
 elect representatives to a convention and to draft a constitution. The act
 524 Stat. 729.
 "5Thorpe, The Federal and State Constitutions, vol. 5, 2940.
 "26 F. Sup. 270 (1939).
 55Ibid., 275.
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 Table 2
 State Enabling Acts with Indian Disclaimer Clauses
 State Date Key language
 Kansas 1861 Indian rights not to be impaired unless extinguished by treaty;
 Indian lands not to be included in state without tribal consent.
 Tribe must signify their assent to the President to be included in
 the State.
 North Dakota 1889 The People and the State forever disclaim all rights to Indian
 lands; those lands remain under absolute federal jurisdiction.
 State may only tax land of individual Indians who have severed
 tribal relations but not if that land was granted by the Congress with
 an express tax exemption.
 South Dakota 1889 Same as above.
 Montana 1889 Same as above.
 Washington 1889 Same as above.
 Utah 1894 Same as above.
 Oklahoma 1906 Indian rights are not to be impaired so long as they have not
 been extinguished. Federal government retains exclusive
 authority to make Indian policy by treaty, agreement, or law.
 New Mexico 1910 Same as Utah.
 Arizona 1910 Same as above.
 Alaska 1958 The People and the State forever disclaim all right to Indian
 land and to any land or other property (e.g., fishing rights) held
 in trust by the United States. All lands and property under absolute
 federal jurisdiction, except when held in fee simple title.
 also specified how the members were to be appointed among the counties,
 determined when elections were to be held, specified the time and place
 for the convention, and stipulated that the constitution must be republican."
 Although the Congress easily created territories, it was far more reluctant to
 create states. Before developments in the late 1880s, only four western
 states had entered the Union: two during the Civil War (Kansas in 1861
 and Nevada in 1864) and two after the war (Nebraska in 1867 and Colorado in
 1876.)57 Six territories finally gained statehood in 1889 and 1890, and each
 had a disclaimer clause in its constitution.
 Nine of the eighteen western states had disclaimer clauses in their
 enabling acts (Table 2). Wyoming and Idaho were admitted to statehood
 without enabling acts because their territorial governments launched state-
 hood and proposed constitutions that were largely in compliance with federal
 policies.58 Both states included disclaimers, however, in their constitutions.
 The first enabling act containing an explicit disclaimer clause was the
 56Gates, History of Public Land Law, 289.
 57Clyde A. Milner II et al., eds., The Oxford History of the American West (New York: Oxford University
 Press, 1994), p. 184.
 58Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, ed. Rennard Strickland, et al., revised ed.
 (Charlottesville, VA: Michie, Bobbs-Merrill, 1982), p. 268.
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 act authorizing Kansas to be admitted to the Union in 1861. Like its 1854
 territorial disclaimer, the 1861 measure declared that nothing in the act
 should be read to impair any preexisting Indian rights or "to affect the
 authority of the government of the United States to make regulations
 respecting such Indians, their lands, property, or other rights."59 This mea-
 sure reflected congressional intent to abide by preexisting treaties with
 Kansas tribes and to remind states of federal supremacy in the field of In-
 dian policy. None of the other three states admitted between 1861 and
 1889 (Nevada, 1864; Nebraska, 1867; or Colorado, 1876) were required to
 insert similar disclaimers in their organic acts, though it is not clear from
 the legislative record why such disclaimers were not a part of these states'
 enabling acts.60 When Congress terminated treaty-making with tribes in
 1871,61 most Indian property was located, or soon would be, in the territories
 and remained under the federal government'sjurisdiction. However, as terri-
 tories prepared for statehood, the leaders of these political units pushed for
 exclusive jurisdiction over all territory--including Indian lands. This coin-
 cided with stepped up federal efforts to assimilate Indians into white society.
 The Cherokee Tobacco decision of 187162 confirmed that Indian treaties could
 be implicitly abrogated by later federal laws. Furthermore, an enabling
 act granting a new state jurisdiction over all territory within its boundaries
 might be construed as an express grant to the state of jurisdiction over
 Indian land, invalidating any treaty provision to the contrary.63 Such a sce-
 nario arose in 1876 when Colorado was the first state admitted after the
 treaty-termination measure of 1871. Although Colorado's territorial act
 contained a disclaimer, the Colorado Constitution did not. In 1881, the
 U.S. Supreme Court ruled in United States v. McBratney' that because Colo-
 rado had not expressly disclaimed jurisdiction over the Ute
 Indian Reservation, state law prevailed on the reservation.
 Every state, except Hawai'i, admitted after McBratney was required to
 acknowledge the federal government's "absolute jurisdiction and control"
 over Indian reservations.6" There is a fairly clear correlation between
 McBratney and the inclusion of Indian disclaimer clauses. Davies argues
 that the insistence on disclaimers after McBratney was a direct response to
 the federal government's loss of jurisdiction to the states after the deci-
 sion," while Lieder asserts that the "temporary conjunction of McBratney
 and the clauses strongly suggests they were a response to that decision."''67
 5912 Stat. 126-127.
 6Lieder, "Adjudication of Indian Water Rights," 1032-1033.
 6116 Stat. 544.
 6270 U.S. (11 Wall.) 116 (1871).
 6'Davies, "State Taxation on Indian Reservations," 136.
 64104 U.S. 621.
 'Lieder, "Adjudication of Indian Water Rights," 1033.
 "Davies, "State Taxation on Indian Reservations," 137.
 67Lieder, "Adjudication of Indian Water Rights," 1033.
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 The 1889 enabling act of North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and
 Washington6" was the first post-McBratney law. The second clause of
 section four entails the disclaimer for these fledgling states:
 That the people inhabiting said proposed States do agree and
 declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the
 unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries
 thereof...and that until the title thereto shall have been
 extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and
 remain subject to the disposition of the United States, and
 said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdic-
 tion and control of the Congress of the United States.... But
 nothing herein, or in the ordinances herein provided for, shall
 preclude the said States from taxing as other lands are taxed
 any lands owned or held by any Indian who has severed his
 tribal relations, and has obtained from the United States or
 from any person a title thereto by patent or other grant, save
 and except such lands as have been or may be granted to
 any Indian or Indians under any act of Congress containing a
 provision exempting the lands thus granted from taxation.69
 This provision guarantees that the federal government retains undivided
 jurisdiction over Indian lands until the Indians are granted their land free
 and clear of all restrictions. Said Indian lands would also be exempt from
 state taxation because of the trust doctrine. The lands were further pro-
 tected because, in some cases, specific laws had been enacted by the
 Congress exempting the lands from taxation for specified periods of
 time. The only way a state could tax an Indian's property under the
 disclaimers was when an individual had chosen to terminate his or her
 membership with their tribe or, in the case of allotted tribes, land was
 subject to taxation once an individual received a patent to his other
 allotment. However, unlike most of the territorial disclaimers, there is
 no mention in this 1889 act of the treaty that originally established the
 basis of Indian rights, nor is there any mention of the fact that Indian
 consent would be required before either the state or the federal govern-
 ment could act against Indian rights. These last points reflect the gen-
 eral policy tenor of the times, with the federal government intent on
 civilizing, privatizing, and Christianizing Indian peoples. Indian con-
 sent was rarely sought, and treaty rights, while still theoretically intact,
 were frequently ignored and often terminated during this period. Utah's
 enabling act of 16 July 1894 was virtually identical to the one above.
 However, Oklahoma's act of 16 June 1906, which spliced together
 6825 Stat. 676.
 6Ibid., 677.
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 Oklahoma Territory and Indian Territory, did mention treaties and read
 more like the territorial disclaimers discussed earlier. It provided:
 That nothing contained in the said constitution shall be construed
 to limit or impair the rights of person or property pertaining to
 the Indians of said Territories (so long as such rights remain
 unextinguished) or to limit or affect the authority of the Gov-
 ernment of the United States to make any law or regulation re-
 specting such Indians, their lands, property, or other rights by
 treaties, agreement, law, or otherwise, which it would have been
 competent to make if this Act had never been passed.70
 The disclaimers for New Mexico and Arizona, contained in the enabling
 act of 20 June 1910,71 were similar to those contained in the 1889 Dakota
 enabling act. Both emphasized the state's permanent agreement never to
 claim Indian lands or to tax Indian territory so long as Congress holds it in
 trust status. The clause, however, did include a brief reference to Indian
 lands recognized by "any prior sovereignty," a recognition that many Pueb-
 los and Spaniards in New Mexico had received land grants from Spain, title
 to which was to be respected under federal law.72
 Alaska was the last state (1958) to have an enabling act containing an
 express disclaimer provision. Although similar in language to that of New
 Mexico and Arizona, it contained a couple of distinctive aspects. First, it
 included not only Indians but Eskimos and Aleuts as well. Second, a spe-
 cific property right--the right to fish--was recognized as being held in trust
 by the federal government and, thus, was exempt from state jurisdiction.
 CONSTITUTIONAL DISCLAIMERS
 State constitutions not only protect rights, they more importantly "create a
 framework for state and local government, allocate powers, announce broad
 policy commitments and, not infrequently, prescribe the means by which
 those commitments will be met. At the most fundamental level, they may
 embody the political identity and aspirations of the state's citizenry."73
 Congress insisted on the insertion of disclaimer clauses in 11 of the
 18 Western state constitutions (Table 3). Generally, the disclaimer provi-
 sions of a state's enabling acts were simply appended to the newly drafted
 constitution. For example, Article One of Montana's Constitution, called
 the Compact with the United States, declares that "all provisions of the
 enabling act of Congress...including the agreement and declaration that
 all lands owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes shall remain under
 7034 Stat. 267-268.
 7136 Stat. 557.
 "7Ibid., 559.
 7-G. Alan Tarr, ed., Constitutional Politics in the States: Contemporary Controversies and Historical Patterns
 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), p. xiv.
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 Table 3
 States with Constitutional Indian Disclaimer Clauses
 State Date Key language
 North Dakota 1889 The People forever disclaim all right and title to Indian held lands;
 they remain subject to U.S. disposition and under absolute federal
 jurisdiction. State may only tax individual Indian land if person
 has severed tribal relations and has title to land. Lands granted by
 Congress containing tax exemption, however, are not taxable by state.
 South Dakota 1889 Same as above.
 Montana 1889 All lands owned or held by Indians remain under absolute
 jurisdiction and control of the Congress until revoked by consent of
 the United States and people of Montana.
 Washington 1889 Same as North Dakota.
 Wyoming 1890 People forever disclaim all right and title to Indian lands; those
 lands subject to absolute federal jurisdiction
 Idaho 1890 People and State forever disclaim all right and title to Indian lands;
 those lands subject to absolute federal jurisdiction.
 Utah 1896 Same as North Dakota.
 Oklahoma 1907 The People forever disclaim all right and title to Indian lands; they
 remain subject to United States jurisdiction.
 New Mexico 1912 Same as North Dakota.
 Arizona 1912 Same as North Dakota.
 Alaska 1959 State and People disclaim all right and title to any property,
 including fishing rights; such property subject to absolute federal
 jurisdiction. State will not impose taxes on Indian property unless
 directed by the Congress, except for lands held in fee simple title.
 the absolute jurisdiction and control of the congress of the United States,
 continue in full force and effect until revoked by the consent of the United
 States and the people of Montana."74 The state was bound to adhere to this
 clause until both the federal government and the citizenry of Montana
 agreed to modify the provision.
 Similarly, North Dakota's enabling act, including the disclaimer, with only
 minor word changes, was incorporated as Article XIII, a Compact with the
 United States, and its provisions were declared to be "irrevocable without
 the consent of the United States and the people of the state.""7 In fact, with
 only stylistic alterations, the constitutional disclaimers of the other western
 states, including South Dakota, Washington, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Ari-
 zona, and Alaska, all very closely resembled the disclaimers found in their
 enabling acts. Idaho and Wyoming, which had been admitted without
 74Constitutions of the United States, National and State, Montana, 1995 (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publica-
 tions, December 1995), p. 1.
 75Ibid., March 1995, 36.
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 enabling acts, each nevertheless included clauses which looked very similar
 to those of the other disclaiming states.
 For example, Section 19 of Idaho's Constitution declared that "the people
 of the state...do agree and declare that we forever disclaim all right and
 title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries thereof,
 and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indians or
 Indian tribes."76 Idaho goes on to admit that Indian lands shall remain
 under the "absolute jurisdiction and control" of Congress and that those
 lands will never be subject to state taxation as long as they remain under
 federal jurisdiction.77
 Notwithstanding these clauses, the federal government has, in a few
 express instances, delegated a measure of its constitutional authority over
 Indian affairs to the states, thus giving the states some jurisdiction inside
 Indian Country.
 FEDERAL DELEGATIONS OF EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY
 The first major action by federal policymakers involving a reading of disclaimer
 clauses that negated the territorial sovereignty of Indian tribes was United
 States v. McBratney.7s This criminal case raised the issue of whether Colo-
 rado had jurisdiction over a non-Indian who had murdered another non-
 Indian on the Ute Indian Reservation. The United States argued that
 existing law, both statutory and treaty, gave it jurisdiction over McBratney.
 The government also cited Colorado's 1861 territorial act, which contained a
 provision expressly disclaimingjurisdiction. However, neither Colorado's 1875
 organic act, which admitted that territory to the Union, nor the state con-
 stitution, which was approved the following year, included disclaimer clauses.
 The U.S. Supreme Court held that because Colorado had been admit-
 ted on an equal footing with the original states and had not expressly dis-
 claimed jurisdiction over the Ute Reservation, and because no Indians were
 directly involved in the case, state law and not federal law governed such
 crimes on the reservation.
 Four years later, in 1885, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down another
 ruling which recognized that in some limited respects, states could wield a
 measure ofjurisdiction in Indian Country. In Utah and Northern Railroad v.
 Fisher,79 the Court stated that the Idaho Territory had a legitimate interest
 in regulating the affairs of whites, even if those activities took place on a
 reservation. In this case, the Court upheld Idaho's authority to tax a non-
 Indian railroad company, which ran its line through the Fort Hall Indian
 Reservation. Idaho's 1863 territorial disclaimer,so like that of Colorado's,
 76Ibid.,January 1994, 40-41.
 77Ibid., 41.
 78104 U.S. 621 (1881).
 79116 U.S. 28 (1885).
 8012 Stat. 808.
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 protects the treaty rights, resources, and tax-exempt status of the Indians,
 but in the Court's reading of that provision, it allowed the tax on the rail-
 road to stand because Indians were not directly involved in the case.
 The next major era in which states gained a measure of power over some
 portion of Indian Country was during the 1950s-the termination period.
 Termination, Congress' effort to sever federal benefits and support services
 to certain Indian groups, was official federal policy from 1953 to the mid-
 1960s. A key act during the termination period was P.L. 280,81 which
 conferred upon several designated (mandatory) states--Arizona, Minnesota,
 Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin-full criminal and some civil jurisdic-
 tion over most reservations in their borders, and consented to the assumption
 of such jurisdiction by any other (optional) state that chose to accept it.
 The language of the act regarding the mandatory states appears to be self-
 executing; that is, it confers "immediate jurisdiction on the [five] states
 without the need for state legislation to make it effective."82 In other words,
 these mandatory states were not required to repeal their disclaimer clauses
 before assuming jurisdiction.
 However, optional states were required to address the disclaimer clause
 issue. Section 6 declared that:
 Notwithstanding the provisions of any Enabling Act for the ad-
 mission of a State, the consent of the United States is hereby
 given to the people of any State to amend, where necessary, their
 State constitution or existing statutes, as the case may be, to re-
 move any legal impediment to the assumption of civil and crimi-
 nal jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this Act:
 Provided, That the provisions of this Act shall not become effec-
 tive with respect to such assumption of jurisdiction by an such
 State until the people thereof have appropriately amended their
 State constitution or statutes as the case may be.8"
 Thus, in authorizing the optional states to assume jurisdiction if they
 chose, the Congress specifically identified those states with constitutional
 or statutory disclaimers, and then required those states to repeal their dis-
 claimers by a constitutional amendment before the act became opera-
 tional.84 These states were informed that to assume such jurisdiction
 would require "the people of the State...by affirmative legislative action"
 to act accordingly.
 Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, who has written extensively about P.L. 280,s5
 states that tribes were upset with the law because their consent was not
 8167 Stat. 588.
 82Goldberg-Ambrose, "Public Law 280," 563.
 8367 Stat. 588.
 84Schwartz, "State Disclaimers ofJurisdiction," 188.
 85See, for example, "Public Law 280," p. 538; Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Planting Tail Feather: Tribal
 Survival and Public Law 280 (Los Angeles, CA: American Indian Studies Center, 1997).
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 required before states assumed jurisdiction.86 States, for their part, were
 dissatisfied because they were not given complete jurisdiction because res-
 ervation lands retained their trust status. Tribal lands held in trust may not
 be taxed by a state. States also learned that treaty rights to hunt and fish,
 for example, survived P.L. 280 and could not be regulated by the state.
 Although tribes continued to question the federal government's authority
 to vest in some states civil and criminal jurisdiction, Congress clearly saw
 state disclaimer clauses as independent obstacles to a state's assertion of
 such jurisdiction otherwise. As Orme Lewis, assistant secretary of the Inte-
 rior, put it in response to a query by Representative Arthur Lewis Miller,
 Chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, when asked
 his office's views on H.R. 1063---the bill that became P.L. 280:
 In each instance [states with disclaimer clauses] the State con-
 stitution contains an appropriate disclaimer. It would appear in
 each case, therefore, that the Congress would be required to
 give its consent and the people of each State would be required
 to amend the State constitution before the State legally could
 assume jurisdiction.87
 The Interior and Insular Affairs Committee echoed this sentiment in its
 report, which stated that the "effect of the disclaimer of jurisdiction over
 Indian land within the borders of these States-in the absence of consent
 being given to future action to assume jurisdiction-is to retain exclusive
 Federal jurisdiction until Indian title in such lands is extinguished; such
 States could, under the bill as reported, proceed to amendment of their
 respective organic laws by proper amending procedure.""88
 Despite the clarity in the language of P.L. 280 and the congressional
 record regarding the conditions under which both mandatory (original
 five states) and optional (all remaining states) states could assume jurisdic-
 tion in Indian Country, six of the eight optional states (Arizona, Montana,
 North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington) with disclaimer clauses
 have passed legislation claiming full or, in some cases, partial jurisdiction over
 Indian residents on reservation lands.89 Of these six states, however, only South
 Dakota has acted to amend its constitutions as required under the 1953 law.
 The noncompliant states claim, contrary to the law's explicit language,
 that a constitutional amendment is not required to assume jurisdiction
 under P.L. 280. They claim that, in fact, their disclaimers only require
 that reservation lands remain under the "absolute jurisdiction and control
 86This crucial dimension was changed with amendments to the act in 1968, the Indian Civil Rights Act
 (ICRA) (82 Stat. 77). One of the ICRA's provisions is that future assertions of statejurisdiction under P.L. 280
 will require Indian consent. States can also return jurisdiction to the federal government if they desire.
 87U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, ConferringJurisdiction on the States
 of California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin, With Respect to Criminal Offenses and Civil Cases and
 Action Committed orArisingon Indian Reservations Within Such States, 83rd Cong., 1st sess., 1953, S. Rep. 699, p. 7.
 88Ibid., 6.
 89Goldberg-Ambrose, "Public Law 280," 569.
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 of the United States." While agreeing that their disclaimers preclude the
 alienation or taxation of Indian trust land, the states believe that they re-
 tain a governmental interest over all lands within their borders; therefore,
 they need not amend their constitutions or statutes because the Congress
 may repeal P.L. 280 at any time and reclaim jurisdiction.90
 Some case law supports this interpretation.9' Nevertheless, such an
 interpretation clashes with the literal language of the congressional record,
 contradicts the historical evidence, presented above, which led to the in-
 troduction of disclaimers in the first place, and contravenes the federal
 government's ongoing treaty and trust relationship with tribes. Further-
 more, such a reading runs contrary to one of the basic principles of federal
 Indian law-that treaties and statutes should be read and interpreted as
 Indians would understand them.92 As Goldberg-Osborne observed:
 The language of P.L. 280 clearly requires constitutional
 amendment, and the legislative history confirms the congres-
 sional intent to impose that requirement. Without question
 Congress has the power to impose conditions on a State's as-
 sumption of jurisdiction over reservation Indians, regardless of
 the soundness of congressional understanding of state law. Thus,
 the burden would seem to fall on the states to demonstrate why
 the clearly manifest intent of Congress should be disregarded.93
 The U.S. Supreme Court reentered the fray a few years later. In Orga-
 nized Village of Kake v. Egan,94 it adopted a narrow view of the clauses, thus
 creating a broad view of state power over indigenous people so long as that
 power does not interfere with reservation self-government. Alaska's State-
 hood Act, like those of a number of western states, contains a disclaimer in
 which the state disavowed "all right and title" to Indian lands. It also provides
 that indigenous land shall remain subject to the "absolute jurisdiction and
 control" of the United States. Upon review of the legislative history preceding
 Alaska's statehood, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "the disclaimer of
 right and title by the State was a disclaimer of proprietary rather than gov-
 ernmental interest.""95 This language was intended to ensure that statehood
 would neither extinguish nor establish claims by Indians against the United
 States. The Court proceeded to note that Congress had paid little atten-
 tion to the disclaiming language vesting "absolute jurisdiction and control"
 over Alaskan native lands in the United States. The Court maintained that
 90Golberg-Ambrose, "Public Law 280," 569-570.
 "9See, for example, Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1961).
 92See, for example, Worcester v. Georgia, 582, where ChiefJustice John Marshall said that "the language
 used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice...How the words of the
 treaty were understood by this unlettered people, rather than their critical meaning, should form the
 rule of construction."
 93Goldberg-Ambrose, "Public Law 280," 573.
 94369 U.S. 60 (1961).
 95Ibid., 69.
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 the words "absolutejurisdiction" did not mean "exclusive jurisdiction," and
 were not intended to deny the state the right to regulate the natives' hunt-
 ing and fishing rights.9
 Under the Court's ruling, Alaska did not need the assistance of P.L. 280
 to exercise jurisdiction over the fishing area in dispute because the territory
 had never been reserved for the natives by Congress. But two commentators97
 have raised questions about the Kake decision. They note, first, that the
 scope of the disclaimer was irrelevant to the result, and need not have been
 brought up because Alaskan natives were not isolated or hostile to the rest
 of the population as were Indians in the other western states.98 As a result,
 "Congress may have had no interest in requiring Alaska to disclaim juris-
 diction over Indians which the Alaska territory had always exercised and
 which the State of Alaska was expected to continue exercising."99 Thus, it
 could be argued that states relying on Kake"have been misinterpreting their
 disclaimers in order to escape the need to repeal them before accepting
 P.L. 280 jurisdiction."100
 Second, a close reading of the congressional record suggests that the Kake
 interpretation is only partially accurate.101 Finally, and presumably, if state dis-
 claimers were deemed to limit only a state's proprietary interest in Indian lands,
 their repeal would be unnecessary to the state's assumption of civil and crimi-
 nal jurisdiction over those lands.102 Moreover, two later U.S. Supreme Court
 cases, Kennerly v. District Court3os and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commis-
 sion,104 emphasize the preemptive effect of P.L. 280 on state attempts to gain
 jurisdiction over reservation lands, without expressly challenging the Kake rul-
 ing.
 Despite these few cases, the preponderance of constitutional, treaty,
 statutory, and judicial evidence, plus the ongoing extraconstitutional
 status of tribes as preexisting sovereigns, support the view that the rela-
 tionship between tribes and the United States remains a federalized one.
 Disclaimer clauses occupy an important position of validity confirming the
 nation-to-nation relationship. Until these clauses have been deliberately
 expunged out of the enabling act, with federal approval, and jettisoned
 from the state's constitution, with the consent of the state's citizenry and
 the federal government's permission, they remain the law of the land.
 96Ibid.
 97Schwartz, "State Disclaimers," 187-190; Goldberg-Ambrose, "Public Law 280," 571-573.
 98Goldberg-Ambrose, "Public Law 280," 571.
 99Ibid.
 '00Ibid.
 'o'Schwartz, "State Disclaimers," 187-188, says that Ralph Barney, then chief of the Indian Claims
 Branch of the Justice Department and the author of Alaska's enabling act disclaimer, testified during
 Senate hearings that the disclaimer was meant to preserve the federal government's police power over
 Alaskan natives on reservations. This testimony seems contrary to the view expressed in Kake that the
 disclaimer limited only the state's "proprietary" interest in indigenous lands.
 '02Ibid., 188-189.
 103400 U.S. 423 (1971).
 '"411 U.S. 164 (1973).
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 AN EXCLUSIVE TRIBAL-FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP
 The U.S. Supreme Court's 1832 Worcester?05 opinion confirmed that state
 law was inapplicable inside Indian Country and that any attempt by the
 states to assert jurisdiction would be rebuffed on account of tribal sover-
 eignty, the nation's treaty-based relationship with tribes, and congressional
 exclusivity in determining the United States' Indian policy.
 The constitutionally affixed tribal-federal relationship remains largely
 federalized despite the sporadic case and statutory examples given in the
 previous section, and notwithstanding the reality that the Rehnquist Court,
 since 1989, presumes a share of state authority in Indian Country unless
 the state has been expressly precluded from exercisingjurisdiction.106 Absent
 a constitutional amendment to the commerce clause, a bilateral renegotia-
 tion of the treaty relationship, or agreed-upon amendments to state enabling
 and constitutional disclaimer clauses, the relationship between tribes and
 the federal government will remain the key partnership. Although Con-
 gress will sometimes pass measures, like the Indian Gaming Regulatory
 Act,107 which require tribes and states to negotiate compacts for certain
 types of gaming, this measure's very existence is a reminder to states that
 the federal government has ultimate responsibility for Indian policies.
 For example, in United States v. Rickert,10o the U.S. Supreme Court held
 that the federal government's constitutional power to dispose of and make
 all needful rules for property belonging to the United States, when com-
 bined with South Dakota's constitutional disclaimer clause, prohibited the
 state from taxing Indian land. "No authority exists," said the Court, "for
 the State to tax lands which are held in trust by the United States for the
 purpose of carrying out its policy in reference to these Indians."109
 In Dick v. United States,110 a liquor-law case, the Court sustained federal
 liquor statutes protecting lands ceded by the Nez Perce Indians against
 liquor introduction for a 25-year period. The Court held that even though
 a state is admitted on an equal footing with other states, the Congress' power
 to regulate commerce with Indian tribes is "superior and paramount to the
 authority of any State within whose limits are Indian tribes." Two years
 later, in United States v. Sutton,"' the Court construed the disclaimer clause
 in Washington State's enabling act to mean that the federal government
 retained exclusive jurisdiction and control over the matter of liquor intro-
 duction on a reservation.
 '5 Worcester v. Georgia, 515.
 '"See, for example, Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Brendale v. Confed-
 erated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian
 Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
 '07102 Stat. 2475.
 108188 U.S. 432 (1903).
 '"gIbid., 441.
 01208 U.S. 340 (1907).
 "'215 U.S. 291 (1909).
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 In United States v. Chavez,"2 the U.S. Supreme Court held that New Mexico
 had no authority to prosecute non-Indian defendants charged with larceny
 committed within the Isleta Pueblo because the U.S. Constitution vests ex-
 clusive authority over such crimes in the federal government. Although
 the state's enabling act admitted New Mexico into the Union "on an equal
 footing" with the original states, "the principle of equality is not disturbed
 by a legitimate exertion by the United States of its constitutional power in
 respect of its Indian wards and their property.""'
 It was not only federal courts which confirmed the tribal-federal
 relationship. There is also some corroborating case law from states. In
 State v. Arthur,"4 the Idaho Supreme Court declared that the admission of
 Idaho into the Union did not operate to repeal hunting rights reserved by
 treaty to the Nez Perce Indians. Although Idaho's admission act was silent
 regarding Indian rights, both the organic act and the state's constitution
 "recognize their rights which arise under the Treaty of 1855 and subse-
 quent agreements and treaties prior to statehood.""15
 In Chino v. Chino,"6 the New Mexico Supreme Court, in discussing that
 state's enabling act, which contained a disclaimer clause, held that the state
 had declined to assume jurisdiction over the Indian reservations in the state
 by failing to take "affirmative steps under Public Law 280" or under more
 recent congressional acts. Thus, "the treaties and statutes applicable in
 this case preclude the state from exercisingjurisdiction over property lying
 within the reservation boundaries.""'17
 In closing, the New Mexico court gave a multifaceted rationale on why
 the state is precluded from assuming jurisdiction over forcible entry and
 wrongful detainer actions on fee-patented lands within reservations. This
 list of reasons confirms many of the arguments identified above: (1) inherent
 tribal sovereignty; (2) treaties, which vest in the federal government exclusive
 jurisdiction; (3) no affirmative delegation by the federal or tribal governments
 authorizing the state to act; (4) the state can only act where asserted tribal
 relations are not involved and where the rights of Indians would not bejeopar-
 dized; (5) the state may not act where the United States has preempted the
 field by treaties or relevant statutes; and (6) state enabling and constitutional
 disclaimers expressly deny states the power to assume such jurisdiction.
 112290 U.S. 357 (1933).
 "3Ibid., 365.
 "114261 P. 2d 135 (1953).
 "SIbid., 138.
 1690 NM 203 (1977).
 "7Ibid., 206.
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 CONCLUSION
 We have examined a significant body of historical, legal, and political
 evidence regarding the tribal-state relationship and the role of the federal
 government in overseeing that relationship. In 1836, the Congress began
 to insert disclaimer clauses in territorial acts, followed by similar clauses in
 state enabling acts in 1861 and state constitutions in 1889. The result was
 that 11 Western state constitutions contain a disclaimer clause. The inclu-
 sion of such clauses appears to be due primarily to the U.S. Supreme Court's
 1881 McBratney decision, which held that in the absence of a state constitu-
 tional disclaimer clause, state law can prevail on an Indian reservation in
 cases involving non-Indians. The primary purposes of these clauses are to
 reiterate exclusive federal authority over Indian affairs, reaffirm tribal sov-
 ereignty vis-a-vis the states, and remind states that their sovereignty in the
 federal system does not extend into Indian Country. Although states have
 often chafed at these limits, the disclaimer clauses have helped to protect
 tribal sovereignty.
 Nevertheless, over the last two centuries, certain congressional policies,
 such as termination, allotment, and especially P.L. 280, as well as some U.S.
 Supreme Court decisions, have variously assaulted or eroded the protec-
 tions afforded tribes by the disclaimer clauses. As a result, there is concern
 among tribes about the ability of the disclaimer clauses to help protect their
 sovereignty, especially in light of the controversy surrounding Indian gam-
 ing and Indian assertions of both sovereign rights and treaty rights in re-
 cent decades. Tribes, therefore, have taken a number of legal, political,
 and educational steps to strengthen protection of their sovereignty.
 Some tribes have worked out sovereignty accords with their host states in
 which both parties agree to respect the sovereignty of the other.118 Such
 action significantly augments tribal sovereignty and is, therefore, a step to-
 ward improving tribal-state relations. But it is only a step because intergov-
 ernmental relations with tribes as a recognized party is a difficult field to
 navigate due to the preconstitutional and extraconstitutional status of tribal
 nations whose members/citizens also enjoy rights as United States citizens.
 The tribes' treaty-recognized sovereignty, which is not generally subject
 to the federal or state constitutions"19 is, however, subject to being reduced
 or completely eliminated by federal action120 and increasingly by state
 "sThe Navajo Nation, for example, in 1994, worked out such an accord with the governors of Arizona,
 New Mexico, and Utah. The idea behind the accord, according to the Navajo president, Peterson Zah, "is
 that since we must coexist as neighbors we must recognize the sovereignty of one another in order to
 effectively meet the needs of our common constituents and resolve our common problems." (Author has
 copy of accord and Zah's memorandum describing the policy.)
 "9See, for example, The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556
 (1883); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); United States v. Wheeler, 435
 U.S. 313 (1978); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
 '20See, for example, United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553
 (1903).
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 action.'21 Hence, tribes must rely not only on the rule of law, but also on
 the "good faith" of the federal and state governments to protect their remain-
 ing sovereign rights. State constitutional disclaimers are an important piece of
 the protective barrier originally erected by the federal government acting
 as the trustee to tribal beneficiaries. Along with the extant treaties and the
 placement of tribes in the commerce clause, the combination of these po-
 litical, legal, and moral forces work, at least sporadically, to secure to tribes
 their remaining political, legal, and resource rights.
 Although states have increased their jurisdictional presence in Indian
 Country in recent years as a result of tribal-state compacts necessitated by
 the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act122 and several U.S. Supreme Court opin-
 ions allowing states to tax fee-simple land inside an Indian reservation,"12
 the relationship between tribal nations and the federal government remains
 fairly exclusive. States may get involved only with express federal permission.
 "'See, for example, Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Brendale v. Confed-
 erated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); County of Yakima v. Confederated
 Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992); Seminole Tribe ofFlorida v. Florida, 517 U.S.
 44 (1996); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
 122102 Stat. 2475.
 '12See, for example, County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 251;
 Cass County, Minnesota v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 118 S.Ct. 1904 (1998).
This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Tue, 03 Dec 2019 19:48:37 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
